The Marren and Page Case List Christensen v Christensen Peters v Peters and

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So it is not at all surprising that on October 22, 2004, the Welfare Division was able to obtain a letter4 from Deputy Attorney General Donald W. Winne reaching the conclusion that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous to allow Welfare to interpret it to permit doing the calculations the way that their computer system was capable of calculating. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that a property settlement agreement between the husband and wife which had, by its terms, vested in each of the parties to the contract an undivided one-half interest as tenants in common in a parcel of real estate, severed the joint tenancy. Executing the deed from joint tenancy to tenants in common was not a condition precedent. I> Courts throughout the country are in fair consensus hold that a spouse can receive a share of any early retirement taken by a member, under the theory that the "early out" benefits are as divisible as the retirements that were given up to receive those benefits, whether or not there is any federal mechanism for direct payment to the former spouse. Very few courts have reached the opposite result.Others have reached that opposite result, just to be reversed on appeal or upheld upon narrow findings of special circumstances. American Bar Association committee recommendations to Congress to make division of retirement benefits non-dischargeable were apparently responsible in part for enactment of the prior subsection (a)(15) exceptions to discharge, but a detailed exploration of those provisions is beyond the scope of these materials. Likewise, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the award of sole custody of the family’s Labrador Retriever to the husband because the wife’s other dogs were a threat to the Labrador’s life.8 This is similar to Nevada’s recent changes to NRS 33.018, taking into account the harm that may succumb to an animal when they are placed with one person or the other. passage, was to "reverse McCarty by returning the retired pay issue to the states."1 Later re-interpretations indicated that this stated declaration of intent might not have totally overruled McCarty after all,2 but in any event treatment of retired pay was again made dependent on the divorce laws of the jurisdictions granting decrees. The court shall allow the abatement to the obligor in the month in which the visitation is exercised, unless otherwise ordered. The abatement shall be pro-rated to the days of visitation. It shall be presumed that the visitation is exercised. If the visitation exercised substantially deviates from the visitation ordered, either party may file a petition for modification without showing any other change in circumstances. Next, the Petition should detail exactly how the child happened to be removed, or retained, from the child’s habitual residence. This might require detailing a straight-forward kidnap,3 or explaining how visitation terms set out in a decree were exceeded when the child was not returned (in the latter case, the better course is to attach as exhibits the relevant court documents setting out the visitation scheme). In either case, in our experience, it has proven helpful, given the various time limits set out in the Convention, to attach a timeline or calendar showing what was supposed to happen, when, and what actually happened. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held where motion for modification of spousal support was filed within the term of support (the last month), but after the final payment was made, the motion to extend the term of support was timely and the district court had jurisdiction to hear it. The term of temporary alimony goes through the last day of the last month of support, even if support was to be paid on the first day of the month. Joint legal custody can exist regardless of the physical custody arrangements of the parties. NRS 125.490(2); Mack, 112 Nev. at 1067, 921 P.2d at 1262 (Shearing, J. concurring). Also, the parents need not have equal decision-making power in a joint legal custody situation. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 776. For example, one parent may have decision-making authority regarding certain areas or activities of the child's life, such as education or healthcare. Id. Ifthe parents in ajoint legal custody situation reach an impasse and are unable to agree on a decision, then the parties may appear before the court "on an equal footing" to have the court decide what is in the best interest of the child. Mack, 112 Nev. at 1067,921 P.2d at 1262 (Shearing, L, concurring); Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 777 n.24. The parties were married May 1963. During the marriage, the parties started aconstruction company. During the trial, the wife introduced into evidence the construction company’s financial statement. According to the statement, the net stock value of the company was $105,449. The husband conceded that the $700,000 gross income figure contained in the financial statement for the preceding ten month period was probably correct. The husband also testified that the company’s accounts payable at the time of trial exceeded the accounts receivable by approximately $20,000 and that if everything was sold, he hoped the company’s assets would cover its liabilities. The district court found that the communityowned business, the construction company, was valueless and awarded it exclusively to the husband. ther, the equitable problem in this scenario is that the parties have not been treated equally for that equal benefit to be received upon the death of the other, because the member is paying more but only getting about the same result. The simplest is to send a freshly (within 90 days) certified copy of the order requiring payment by the retired member of child support, alimony, or a property award (including any order to pay lump sum property equalization, or awards such as attorney’s fees, but ironically not including orders for payment of arrearages in military retired pay itself), to DFAS, along with the appropriate application form.1 B> As documented in an extensive study by the American Bar Associationfs Center on Children and the Law,1 inconsistency of interpretation of the UCCJA and the technicalities of applying the PKPA, resulted in a loss of uniformity among the States. The Obstacles Study suggested a number of amendments which would eliminate the inconsistent state interpretations and harmonize the UCCJA with the PKPA. e equities are not much different even where the marriage and service overlap for less than the full time of the marriage. Again, the military member always has the much better deal. Again, if the spouse dies first, the member gets the full gross military retirement benefits, but if the member dies first, the spouse continues to get only her share of the benefits. Note that under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1), it is not permissible to pay the former spouse more than 50% of the monthly lifetime military retired pay. Thus, if it is intended that the former spouse receive more than about 46 percent, and that the member is to pay the SBP premium, some mechanism other than the shifting set forth above will be needed to effect that end. After determining the total number of parenting time days, refer to "Parenting Time Table A" below. The left column of the table sets forth numbers of parenting time days in increasingly higher ranges. Adjacent to each range is an adjustment percentage. The parenting time adjustment is calculated as follOWS: locate the total number of parenting time days per year in the left column of "Parenting Time Table A" and select the adjustment percentage from the adjacent column. Multiply the Basic Child Support Obligation determined under Section 8 by the appropriate adjustment percentage. The number resulting from this multiplication then is subtracted from the proportionate share of the Total Child Support Obligation of the parent who exercises parenting time. As the number of parenting time days approaches equal time sharing (143 days and above), certain costs usually incurred only in the custodial household are assumed to be substantially or equally shared by both parents. These costs are for items such as the child's clothing and personal care items, entertainment and reading materials. If this assumption is rebutted by proof, for example, that such costs are not substantially or equally shared in each household, only "Parenting Time Table B" must be used to calculate the parenting time adjustment for this range of days. Locate the total number of parenting time days per year in the left column of "Parenting Time Table B" and select the adjustment percentage from the adjacent column. Multiply the Basic Child Support Obligation determined under Section 8 by the appropriate adjustment percentage. The number resulting from this multiplication then is subtracted from the proportionate share of the Total Child Support Obligation of the parent who exercises parenting time. Spousal consent is also required for any loans borrowed against the TSP. Again, a specific category of "hardship" for loan purposes is "unpaid legal costs associated with a separation or divorce." Such a loan, if taken, accrues interest at the same rate paid on the "G" category of investments. SPAN> The Court stated in Wesley that given the reality of greater overall expenses in a sharedcustody case, the Court’s goal was "to maintain the comparable lifestyle of the child between the parents’ households." 2. A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. . . . In Waltz v. Waltz,18 the divorce decree had awarded the entire military retirement to the husband, but ordered him to pay to the former spouse, by military allotment, the sum of $200.00 plus cost of living adjustments, as "permanent alimony." The facts showed that the military service overlapped the marriage by just less than ten years, precluding direct payment of a property award through the military pay center under the USFSPA. The Court noted that NRS 125.150(5) provides that specified periodic payments to a former spouse must cease unless "it was otherwise ordered by the court," and found that in the context of this case, the parties’ use of the phrase "permanent alimony," in conjunction with the COLA clause, showed their intent to link it to the military retired pay. In conjunction with the testimony below as to intent, the Court was led to the conclusion that the divorce court had "otherwise ordered" within the meaning of the statute. The Court reiterated that payments to a former spouse do not terminate upon her remarriage when the payments are clearly a property settlement, even if denominated "permanent alimony," as here. This is a most dangerous situation for a former spouse. As noted in the section above, spouses lose DIC eligibility upon divorce. And as set out below, there is normally no SBP coverage until after retirement. In other words, the former spouse risks total divestment if the member dies during the period between divorce and the memberfs actual retirement. 65279;The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that while an agreement between the husband and wife is not binding upon the court in the original divorce proceeding, citing to Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398,2 P.2d 131 (1931) and The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that while an agreement between the husband and wife is not binding upon the court in the original divorce proceeding, citing to Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398,2 P.2d 131 (1931) and Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, 45 P.2d 792 (1935), in a post-divorce action on a nonmerged agreement for support, the agreement controls the court and it does not have jurisdiction to modify that agreement or grant different relief citing to Ballin v. Ballin, 78 Nev. 224, 371 P .2d 32 (1962). The Court noted that the husband’s residence and his intent, however, were factual matters for the court’s determination to like extent as any other matters of fact citing to Covington v. Second Judicial District Court, 56 Nev. 313, 50 P.2d 517 (1935); Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, 45 P.2d 792, 56 Nev. 377, 54 P.2d 226 (1935) and Grant v. Grant, 38 Nev. 185, 147 P. 451 (1915). The inconsistency between the husband’s sworn residential intent and the fact of his absences presented a factual problem that was the function of the district court to resolve. Given the duties of the district court, the decree was not void, but voidable. The Court noted that it is recognized that the remarriage of a party does not of itself deprive the court of the power to vacate the decree citing to Smith v. Smith, 68 Nev.10, 226 P.2d 279 (1951). Under the circumstances, the Court found no error in setting aside the decree which annulled the marriage to the second wife. The Court held that decree not being void, but at most voidable, and the proceedings to set it aside without notice to the second wife were ineffectual. It may not be that simple, however, as the member can elect between CRDP and CRSC annually, and which would actually provide more money in a given year can vary throughout the phase-in of CRDP. From the spouse’s point of view, the money may just "stop" one or more times, requiring re-application each year, with no explanation from DFAS as to what happened or why.2 This is the classic divorce scenario - whether divorce occurs before or after retirement, it is usually expected that both parties will continue to live until after the member retires from active duty. The Court noted in that case that the husband was 20 years older than his 60-year old wife and in poor health, and the wife had few assets and no hope of employment, so that such an award of alimony would have been just and equitable. On that basis, the Court found an abuse of discretion in the lower court’s failure to award permanent or lump-sum alimony. It held that the claim for lump-sum alimony did not abate even upon the death of the husband, and that a "permanent alimony" award would not abate if the court had "otherwise ordered" that the claim survived death, and remanded. SUP> Under ICARA, the petitioner may choose the court in which to file a Hague Convention proceeding. It should be heard in any forum on an expedited calendar, but practical concerns could lead to different results in different places. So it is not at all surprising that on October 22, 2004, the Welfare Division was able to obtain a letter4 from Deputy Attorney General Donald W. Winne reaching the conclusion that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous to allow Welfare to interpret it to permit doing the calculations the way that their computer system was capable of calculating. Both Constitutional provisions are entitled to equal deference, and in Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty,2 this Court stated that when possible, the interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision will be harmonized with other statutes or provisions "to avoid unreasonable or absurd results." Second, by way of Concurrent Receipt (also called "Concurrent Disability Pay," or "CDP"),1 all retirees with 20 years of service and VA disability ratings of 50% or higher, had their retired pay offsets phased out over a ten year period. In other words, the military retired pay previously waived for disability pay would be slowly restored, until the retirees were receiving both their full retired pay and the VA disability payments.

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